The emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) brings tremendous benefits and opportunities for individuals and businesses. However, there exist several challenges that need to be addressed before a full realization of IoT can be achieved. Fundamentally, IoT enables constant transfer and sharing of data between several "things" (i.e. humans and objects) in order to achieve particular objectives. In such sharing environments, security and privacy of data and messages become important. Authentication, authorization. access control, non-repudiation are important to ensure secure communication in an IoT environment. The lack of computing resources (such as processing power, storage, etc.) and ad-hoc nature of such networks requires researcher to re-think existing techniques to adopt to such environments. In this paper, we propose a framework for authentication, authorization and access control for an IoT environment using capability tokens, PKI and encryption which aims to use minimal computing resources.
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) has recently drawn tremendous attention of professional and academic researchers. More and more multi-disciplinary research is embarked to realize the full implementation of IoT. The notion of IoT refers to the interconnection of heterogeneous entities in a networked environment that share a sheer massive amount of data. Such data can be applied to create information that is useful and advantageous to the users. One critical aspect of IoT is the communication between entities. Such communication can be in a form of Human to Human (H2H), Human to Thing (H2T), and Thing to Thing (T2T) [1] . Furthermore, IoT also heavily relies on the presence of numerous objects or things that cooperate with each other to reach a common objective [2] . These objects or things can be in form of sensors, RFID tags, mobile phones, etc. For example, in an IoT environment, the temperature sensor, the book's RFID tag and the traffic sensor send data to user's mobile phone providing information about the current temperature, the location of the book and the road traffic condition.
IoT encompasses and integrates several technology concepts such as pervasive computing, ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence [3] . It creates a seamless integration between the physical and digital world by structuring the applications, services, networks, middleware, and devices in a way that full communication between them can be achieved. Such structural change is needed to bring a complete capability that enhances our everyday lives and experience. Once implemented, it is expected that IoT will boost the effectiveness and efficiency of individuals and businesses. Some examples on the advantages of IoT can be seen from the vision presented in [3, 4] , such as automation of industrial manufacturing, intelligence logistics and transportations, enhanced learning, digital e-health, etc.
Although IoT provides great number of advantages, the realization of IoT is highly dependent on the resolution of several challenging issues. The central issue to IoT is the standards for allowing an interoperable and secure communication between the objects or things. With possibly thousands of objects interacting and sharing information in IoT, there is a critical need for a resilient network architecture that provides seamless interoperability and secure sharing of data. At the current state, the emergence of IPv6 [5] and web services (SOA) [6] provides a promising building block for achieving the interoperability between IoT objects. However, the adequacy of security mechanisms and protocols for securing IoT communication network still remains a challenging issue.
In this paper, we focus at discussing several pressing issues related to security in IoT implementation, particularly in the area of authentication, authorization and access control. Our discussion continues to the proposed security mechanism for protecting and governing access to objects. The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section II discusses several security issues pertinent to the IoT implementation. Section III provides review on several existing work in the area of security at current computing environments. Section IV outlines a proposed solution. Section V concludes the paper.
Security Issues in IoT
Security is an important aspect that needs to be considered to ensure the protection of information assets. Essentially, the protection of information assets is all about upholding and maintaining the security properties, i.e. the confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation of information. This is achieved through the implementation of authentication, authorization, encryption and access control mechanisms. Similarly, securing IoT is also about maintaining the abovementioned security properties. However, the characteristics and limitations of objects in IoT pose several constraints and issues to their security protection.
We identified several major security issues in IoT as follow: A.
Identifying and Authenticating Consumer and Service Provider Objects
In an IoT environment, there are possibly thousands of objects offering and consuming services. These objects may come together to form an ad-hoc network for achieving particular objectives or they may just use services in a pay and go fashion. Both the consumer objects and service provider objects needs to be authenticated.
In any of these situations, access to the services should be governed and given only to the authorized objects. Also, objects which provide services themselves need to be authenticated. A framework and architecture to provide such authentication services is needed.
B. Authorisation Permissions Management
Various access permissions may be assigned to each service that an object provides. Similar to our computer file system (e.g. Microsoft DACL [7] ), each service can have various permissions and these permissions can be assigned to different users/objects. Considering a huge number of objects and users as well as a massive amount of services in an IoT environment, an effective authorization mechanism is needed. Such mechanism should allow the assignment and governance of access permissions to different users and objects.
Moreover, access to services may be limited within a specific time-frame depending on each user/object's subscription to the services. This is particularly important for both ad-hoc networks and pay as you go services. Once the subscription ends, user/object access and its permissions to the services must be limited.
C. De-centralized vs Centralized Security Architecture
Communications between objects in IoT may happen on demand. For example, several objects with similar purpose come together and create a short-lived ad-hoc network. In this ad-hoc network, objects cooperatively share their information and perform certain tasks to achieve the purpose. Once the objective is achieved, the ad-hoc network will be dissolved. To meet this requirement, a de-centralized architecture is far more favored as it allows the creation of ad-hoc networks that operate in stand-alone manner. Through de-centralized architectures, an object in IoT is able to communicate to other users/objects without the constraint of central security services. On the contrary, the centralized architectures limit the creation of ad-hoc networks due to their over-reliance on the dedicated central security services.
In addition, the de-centralized architectures also prevent the single point of control and/or failure. In the centralized architectures, the central servers that provide security services are prone to errors and attacks. When the central servers are unavailable, security services for the entire IoT environment may be disrupted. In such situations, the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information are threatened.
Furthermore, the centralized architectures for assigning and governing access permissions are not practical. This is due to a huge number of objects and users that offer various services with numerous access permissions. And as IoT environment grows in size and diversity, these centralized architectures would experience administrative issues in managing and authorizing the access permissions.
Although the de-centralized architectures are more favored for allowing the seamless interactions and collaborations between IoT objects, such architectures also has a number of limitations, such as complexity and computation overhead for each IoT object.
D. Limited Computation Resources
IoT objects (e.g. sensors, RFID tags, etc.) and devices (e.g. mobile phones, tablets) have tight computation resources regarding the CPU, memory, storage and energy. Thus, it affects the design of its security protocols or mechanisms. Resource intensive cryptography processes may not be suitable for implementation in IoT environment. Thus, the main challenge is to efficiently build the encryption algorithms that are faster and less energy-consuming [3] .
Furthermore, security mechanism for governing access and authorization permissions must take into account the limited CPU, memory and storage. That is, scare storage resource limits the amount of access permissions that can be deposited in an object while scare CPU and memory resources limit the authorization and access control processes that an object could perform.
Related Work
Due to the recent introduction in the concept of Internet of Things, limited research has been undertaken to solely focus in this area. Nevertheless, several existing solutions for other environments (i.e. internet, grid computing, peer-to-peer, sensors, etc.) could potentially be applied in IoT. Thus, in this section, we review several existing authentication, authorization and security protocols.
Several prominent authentication mechanisms have been proposed to manage entity's credentials and to provide authentication services. Identity Provider (IdP) and Credential Provider [8] utilize a central mechanism for storing client credentials and for providing these credentials to the providers on every authentication process. During client authentication process, resource provider needs to request client credential to its trusted IdP. The client's credential is responsible for verifying the authenticity of a client before access to resources is given. In latter development, several technology standards such as SAML [9] and Liberty Alliance [10] are adopted in IdP to provide the federation mechanism of multiple entities for Single Sign On (SSO) services. Similarly, the Credential Server (CRES) [11] and the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) MyProxy [12] utilizes the IdP concept, and they further leverage its concept for a large number of dispersed servers over a wide geographical area. Both mechanisms store clients' credentials in the local server while the authentication of a remote client can be facilitated by requesting his credential from this trusted server. However, as mentioned in the previous section, the conspicuous issue of single server failure must be carefully considered when applying the above-mentioned security mechanisms for IoT environment. In an event where the credential provider server is unavailable, the authentication security services will not be available.
Our literature review also identifies several authorization solutions take a similar approach to the authentication mechanisms. The most prominent authorization mechanisms, such as CAS [13] , Akenti [14] , and PMI [15] , utilize a central server for assigning multiple access permissions to the clients although their implementations differ from one another. Besides the issue of single point failure, these mechanisms also inherit several other issues, such as serious administrative burden [16] . It is challenging for the central servers to assign numerous access permissions as a single resource could be associated with multiple different access permissions, and each entity may have different access permissions assigned to it. Over time, the central server would require a large overhead for storing these access permissions. In addition, serious administration issues also occur as IoT environment grows in size and diversity due to its great benefits. The central servers will experience the overhead to manage all client and providers' accounts.
Our review also identifies several security protocols for securing communication network. Several IP-based security solutions (i.e. IKEv2 [17] , TLS/SSL [18] , DTLS [19] , HIPv2 [20] , EAP [21] , etc.) appear to be a great contender for securing IoT environment. IKEv2/IPSec is a protocol that resides at or above OSI network layer, and it is responsible to perform credential key exchange and secure delivery. TLS and DTLS (datagram version of TLS) provides secure transport of data over the network using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). EAP supports various authentication methods, and it works over data link layer of OSI. While these IP based security solutions provides secure and reliable connection, they do not provide access permission assignments and access control.
Proposed Solution
In this section, we propose our solution to manage the identification and authorization permissions in IoT environment considering several issues that were identified in section II. Consuming a service in IoT environment generally takes two stages: (i.) service provider authentication, (ii.) the initial provisioning of service and (iii.) the subsequent regular consumption of service. The following sub-sections provide detail discussion on each of these stages including its proposed security protection. For the rest of this paper, we term consumer user/object as the user/object that consumes a service while provider object as the object that provides services in IoT.
Provider Object Authentication
The Provider object needs to be authenticated. The present de-facto standard of authentication in the Internet is Public Key Infrastructure. A Certificate Authority (CA) provides a digitally signed certificate to the provider object which can be used to authenticate the provider object as well as provide a confidential means of communicating with the provider object using its public key. Although CA subscribes to a centralised model where CAs (i.e. centralised servers) are used to authenticate provider objects, the actual authentication process is distributed. CAs are not contacted during the authentication process. If the web browser trusts the CA signed certificate, the authentication of the provider is accepted. This fact allows us to subscribe to PKI for provider object authentication in IoT environment.
Initial Provision of Service
If access restrictions to a service are required, the first step in the process is to authenticate the consumer object and grant appropriate access (i.e. register for a service subscription). During the subscription process, a consumer user/object needs to be identified and access permissions to the service needs to be assigned.
We propose the use of a capability token as a method for assigning access permissions for each consumer user/object. Capability token contains all the necessary right permissions for each consumer user/object to perform a set of operations on a particular service. Extensible Markup Language (XML) [22] can be used as the capability token to define the access permissions of consumer user/object. XML is chosen due to its simplicity, interoperability, and self-descriptive technology. Further, an XML file does not require massive storage which is advantageous for IoT objects that has limited resources. This token can be signed by the provider object. As depicted in Figure 1 , capability token contains all access permissions on a particular service. Furthermore, it may also contain additional information such as URL for the service, assigned user/object ID, time-created and subscription period. The URL allows a consumer user/object to query and consume the provider's service. Both time-created and subscription period are critical for determining the allowed time-period for using the service. If subscription period ends, access to the service will be revoked.
Fig. 1 Possible design of capability token
The capability token is created by the provider object for each consumer user/object. Once it is created during the subscription process, the capability token is sent to the consumer user/object. On regular service consumptions, the capability token is presented to the provider object as means for granting access permissions to the resources.
A threat may occur during the transmission of capability token from provider object to consumer user/object. Malicious entity may intercept the transmission and steals the capability token. Thus, this malicious entity is able to consume provider object's service by providing the stolen capability token. To mitigate such threat, we propose the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for securing the transmission of capability token. One concern with the utilization of PKI for IoT environment is it needs intensive resources for its encryption/decryption processes. Such intensive processes significantly impact the performance of IoT objects as they are resource constrained in nature. However, to date, there are a growing number of research in security protocols that show efforts to reduce the cryptographic cost for PKI. For example, the security protocols that are discussed in section III (i.e. IKEv2 [17] , TLS/DTLS [18] , HIP/Diet-Hip [20] , etc.). To increase the performance, majority of the research utilize the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm [23] for its PKI cryptographic and signature. In this paper, we left out the selection and implementation of low-cost PKI protocol as it is not the major focus of this paper. However, it is important to note that our proposed solution utilizes and updates some features of PKI protocol for the secure communication of capability token and data. Figure 2 shows the workflow of the initial provision of service between the two objects in IoT environment. Such workflow implements the creation and transmission of capability token. The description for each step is detailed as follow:
Step 1. Consumer user/object makes an initial contact to the provider object for the purpose of consuming the service. Step 2. Provider object provides its public key to the consumer user/object. The public key provides identification of provider object to the consumer user/object. Step 3. Both consumer and provider objects negotiate and agree on a symmetric key. Symmetric key is crafted to reduce the cryptographic resources in the encryption and decryption process of capability token.
Step 4. Consumer user/object subscribes to provider object's service. Then, provider object creates a capability token which contains all access permissions given to this consumer user/object. Further, the provider object may also sign the capability token to ensure the integrity of token for the subsequent consumptions of service.
Fig. 2 Initial service provision workflow
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Step 5. The capability token is encrypted using symmetric key that was crafted in step 3. Once encrypted, the capability token is sent to the consumer user/object. Step 6. The consumer user/object then decrypts this token.
Step 7. The received capability token is stored in its repository securely for regular service consumptions. Once all steps are performed, the consumer user/object stores the lightweight capability token in its repository. Additionally, depending on the storage capacity of consumer user/object, it may also store the public key of provider object. Such public keys can be used in the subsequent service consumptions. Note that, this stage (the initial provision of service) happens only once which is during the initial service consumption. Thus, all subsequent service consumptions do not require the creation of capability token.
Regular Consumption of Services
The next stage is the regular service consumption in which the consumer user/object consumes provider's service. The consumer user/object is able to consume provider's service at any time within the subscription period that is listed in its capability token. When consumer user/object would like to consume provider's service, it provides its capability token to the provider object. The capability token was created in the previous stage (i.e. the initial service consumption).
The capability token serves as the identification badge of consumer object. Further, it also contains the access permissions for the service. Figure 3 shows the overall workflow for the regular service consumption.
Detailed explanation on each step is provided below:
Step 1 & 2. Consumer user/object makes contact to the provider object for the purpose of consuming its service. Then, the provider object provides its public key. These two steps can be skipped if the consumer user/object stores provider's public key during the initial service provision stage.
Step 3. Consumer user/object encrypts the capability token along with a session key and transmits this token to the provider object. Step 4. Provider object then decrypts the transmitted capability token and session key.
Step 5. Provider object verifies the originality of capability token. The verification processes include the validation on provider signature in the token (see Step 4 on the initial service provision stage) and the validation on the subscription period. If verification processes fail, access to the service is declined. If verification processes succeeds, provider object allows consumer object to consume its services based on the authorization permissions that are contained in the capability token. Future communication may use a secure channel using the symmetric key.
Discussion
The previous section provides our proposal for identifying, authenticating, authorizing and securing access to services in IoT environment. The utilization of capability token provides means for assigning and managing the authorization permissions over numerous consumer users/objects and various services. Key features of our proposed security mechanism are explained as follow: 1. De-centralized architectures -our proposed security mechanism does not solely rely on central architectures to provide security services. Authentication process uses the decentralized mechanisms of PKI to authenticate provider object while authentication of consumer object is decentralised. Authorization and access control is entirely decentralized with few resources utilization.
2. One party public key credential -Public key credential is used by the provider object to provide its identity. On the contrary, the consumer user/object do not use the public key credential, instead it uses the capability token for similar purpose. As consumer user/object does not need to provide its public key, public key exchanges between the consumer and provider objects are not required.
3. Efficient storage capacity -In our proposed solution, access permissions to each individual user/object are assigned in a capability token. Thus, each object does not need to maintain the traditional Access Control List (ACL) in its storage. The limited storage that each IoT object has can be dedicated for its core services. Furthermore, the capability token is created in lightweight technology that does not consume massive amount of storage for consumer user/object.
4. Automatic authentication service -authentication in our proposed solution is also performed through a capability token. Consumer user/object is authenticated by providing the original capability token. Thus, no username/password is required for accessing the provider object's service.
5. Time context -Access to resources is allowed within a specified time-frame. If consumer user/object attempts to access the resources outside of its subscription timeframe, its access will be declined. This reflects the realworld interactions where access is limited by the subscription periods.
6. On regular service consumptions, consumer user/object use the service URL that is listed in the capability token when contacting the provider object. This reduces threats of phishing attacks [24] in which consumer user/object is redirected to the fraudulent address.
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The Internet of Things (IoT) allows its objects and users to intensely share their data and also to engage in collaborations. However, such intense sharing of data and collaborations must be equipped with sufficient security protection. In this paper, several security issues pertaining to IoT environment are presented. Fundamentally, the authentication, authorization and access control are critical to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of services in an IoT environment. However, the fact that IoT objects have limited resources and the requirements for reducing single point of control and failure further leads to the difficulty in maintaining adequate security. Thus, in order to solve this issue, a low-cost security solution is proposed in this paper. The objectives are to provide authentication mechanisms and to govern access control on the provided services to numerous objects in IoT environment. Two secure workflows for accessing the service are provided to achieve these objectives. Future work includes the implementation of the proposed security solutions and its performance measurement.
